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Abstract— This paper presents a prepare-and-measure scheme
using N -dimensional quantum particles as information carriers
where N is a prime power. One of the key ingredients used
to resist eavesdropping in this scheme is to depolarize all Pauli
errors introduced to the quantum information carriers. Using
the Shor-Preskill-type argument, we prove that this scheme is
unconditionally secure against all attacks allowed by the laws of
quantum physics. For N = 2n > 2, each information carrier can
be replaced by n entangled qubits. In this case, there is a family
of eavesdropping attacks on which no unentangled-qubit-based
prepare-and-measure quantum key distribution scheme known
to date can generate a provably secure key. In contrast, under
the same family of attacks, our entangled-qubit-based scheme re-
mains secure whenever 2n ≥ 4. This demonstrates the advantage
of using entangled particles as information carriers and of using
depolarization of Pauli errors to combat eavesdropping attacks
more drastic than those that can be handled by unentangled-
qubit-based prepare-and-measure schemes.
Index Terms— Depolarization, entanglement purification, local
quantum operation, Pauli error, phase error correction, quantum
key distribution, Shor-Preskill proof, two-way classical commu-
nication, unconditional security
I. INTRODUCTION
KEY distribution is the art of sharing a secret key betweentwo cooperative players Alice and Bob in the presence
of an eavesdropper Eve. If Alice and Bob distribute their key
by exchanging classical messages only, Eve may at least in
principle wiretap their conversations without being caught. So,
given unlimited computational resources, Eve can crack the
secret key. In contrast, in any attempt to distinguish between
two non-orthogonal states, information gain is only possible
at the expense of disturbing the state [1]. Therefore, if Alice
and Bob distribute their secret key by sending non-orthogonal
quantum signals, any eavesdropping attempt will almost surely
affect their signal fidelity. Consequently, a carefully designed
quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme allows Alice and
Bob to accurately determine the quantum error rate, which in
turn reflects the eavesdropping rate. If the estimated quantum
error rate is too high, Alice and Bob abort the scheme and
start all over again. Otherwise, they perform certain privacy
amplification procedures to distill out the final key [2], [3],
[4], [5], [6]. It is, therefore, conceivable that a provably
secure QKD scheme exists even when Eve has unlimited
computational power.
With this belief in mind, researchers proposed many QKD
schemes [6]. These schemes differ in many ways such as
the Hilbert space dimension of the quantum particles used,
as well as the states and bases Alice and Bob prepared and
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measured. The first QKD scheme, commonly known as BB84,
was invented by Bennett and Brassard [7]. In BB84, Alice
randomly and independently prepares each qubit in one of
the following four states: |0〉, |1〉 and (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2, and
sends them to Bob. After receiving the qubits, Bob randomly
and independently measures each qubit in either {|0〉, |1〉}
or {(|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2} bases. In short, BB84 is an experimen-
tally feasible prepare-and-measure (PM) scheme involving the
transfer of unentangled qubits [7]. Later, Bruß introduced
another experimentally feasible PM scheme known as the
six-state scheme [8]. In this scheme, Alice randomly and
independently prepares each qubit in one of the following
six states: |0〉, |1〉, (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2 and (|0〉 ± i|1〉)/√2; and
Bob measures each of them randomly and independently in
one of the following three bases: {|0〉, |1〉}, {(|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2}
and {(|0〉± i|1〉)/√2}. Although the six-state scheme is more
complex and generates a key less efficiently, Bruß found that
it tolerates higher noise level than BB84 if Eve attacks each
qubit individually [8]. In addition to qubit-based schemes such
as BB84 and the six-state scheme, a number of PM QKD
schemes involving higher dimensional or continuous systems
have been proposed [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15],
[16], [17]. Most importantly, compared with qubit-based PM
schemes, studies showed that many PM schemes involving
higher dimensional systems can generate secure keys when a
higher fraction of particles is eavesdropped individually [13],
[14], [15], [16], [18].
Instead of using PM schemes, Alice and Bob may explicitly
use their shared entanglement to create a secret key. The first
such entanglement-based (EB) QKD scheme was proposed by
Ekert [19]. This scheme makes use of the fact that measuring a
singlet state (|01〉− |10〉)/√2 along a common axis produces
a pair of anti-correlated random bits. Consequently, a common
key can be established provided that Alice and Bob share
singlets through a quantum communication channel. To ensure
that the fidelity of the shared singlets is high, Alice and Bob
check if certain Bell’s inequalities are maximally violated
in a randomly selected subset of their shared particles [19].
Comparing with PM schemes, a typical EB scheme generates a
key more efficiently but is harder to implement experimentally.
Are these QKD schemes really secure? Is it true that the
six-state scheme tolerates higher error level than BB84? The
answers to these questions turn out to be highly non-trivial.
Recall that the all powerful Eve may choose to attack the
transmitted qubits collectively by applying a unitary operator
to entangle these qubits with her quantum particles. In this
situation most of our familiar tools such as classical probability
theory do not apply to the resultant highly entangled non-
classical state. These make rigorous cryptanalysis of BB84,
2the six-state and Ekert schemes extremely difficult.
In spite of these difficulties, air-tight security proofs against
all possible eavesdropping attacks of BB84, the six-state and
Ekert schemes have been discovered. Rigorous proofs of QKD
schemes with better error tolerance have also been found.
Mayers [4] and Biham et al. [20] eventually proved the
security of BB84 against all kinds of attacks allowed by the
known laws of quantum physics. In particular, Mayers showed
that in BB84 a provably secure key can be generated whenever
the bit error rate is less than about 7% [4]. (A precise definition
of bit error rate can be found in Def. 3 in Subsection IV-A.
Moreover, we emphasize that, unless otherwise stated, all
provably secure error rates quoted in this paper are provable
lower bounds. A QKD scheme may generate a secure key at a
higher error rate although a rigorous proof has not been found.)
Along a different line, Lo and Chau [3] proved the security
of an EB QKD scheme, which is similar to the Ekert scheme,
that applies up to 1/3 bit error rate by means of a random
hashing technique based on entanglement purification [21].
Their security proof is conceptually simple and appealing.
Nevertheless, their scheme requires quantum computers and
hence is not practical yet. By ingeniously combining the
essence of the Mayers and Lo-Chau proofs, Shor and Preskill
gave a security proof of BB84 that applies up to 11.0% bit
error rate [22]. This is a marked improvement over the 7%
bit error tolerance rate in Mayers’ proof. Since then, the
Shor-Preskill proof became a blueprint for the cryptanalysis
of many QKD schemes. For instance, Lo [23] as well as
Gottesman and Lo [24] extended it to cover the six-state QKD
scheme. At the same time, the work of Gottesman and Lo
also demonstrates that careful use of local quantum operation
plus two-way classical communication (LOCC2) increases the
error tolerance rate of QKD. Furthermore, they found that the
six-state scheme tolerates a higher bit error rate than BB84
because the six-state scheme gives better estimates for the
three Pauli error rates [24]. In search of an unentangled-qubit-
based (UQB) QKD scheme that tolerates higher bit error rate,
Chau recently discovered an adaptive entanglement purifica-
tion procedure inspired by the technique used by Gottesman
and Lo in Ref. [24]. He further gave a Shor-Preskill-based
proof showing that this adaptive entanglement purification
procedure allows the six-state scheme to generate a provably
secure key up to a bit error rate of (5 − √5)/10 ≈ 27.6%
[25], making it the most error-tolerant PM scheme involving
the transfer of unentangled qubits to date.
Unlike various UQB QKD schemes, very little cryptanalysis
against the most general type of eavesdropping attack on a
QKD scheme involving the transfer of higher dimensional
quantum systems or entangled qubits has been performed. The
only relevant work to date seems to be the earlier version of
this work [17]. In that manuscript, an unconditionally secure
QKD scheme that generalized the six-state scheme by using
conjugation to cyclically permute O(N) kinds of quantum er-
rors that can occur in the N -dimensional quantum information
carriers was reported. Moreover, the set of preparation and
measurement bases used is mutually unbiased [17]. Probably
because Pauli errors are not depolarized when N > 2, the error
tolerance capability of that scheme is not particularly high
under the most general type of attack when 2 < N . 16. More
importantly, that scheme does not conclusively demonstrate the
superiority of using entangled qubits to combat Eve [17]. In
contrast, almost all cryptanalysis suggests that QKD schemes
involving higher dimensional systems are more error-tolerant
under individual particle attack [13], [14], [15], [18]. It is,
therefore, instructive to find an unconditionally secure PM
QKD scheme based on entangled qubits that stands up to
more drastic eavesdropping attacks than all known UQB PM
schemes known to date.
In this paper, we analyze the security and error tolerance
capability of a PM QKD scheme involving the transmission of
higher dimensional quantum particles or entangled qubits. In
fact, this scheme makes use of N -dimensional quantum infor-
mation carriers prepared and measured randomly in N(N+1)
different bases. (In the cases of N = 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, the number
of bases used can be reduced to (N +1).) Such a preparation
and measurement procedure depolarizes all Pauli errors in the
transmitted signal. This greatly restricts the form of errors
occurring in the quantum signals and makes error estimation
effective; hence, its error tolerance rate is high. Nonetheless,
the high error tolerance rate comes with a price, namely, that
the efficiency of the scheme drops.
This paper is organized as follows: We first review the
general assumptions on the capabilities of Alice, Bob and
Eve, as well as a precisely stated security requirement for
a general QKD scheme in Section II. Then we introduce an
EB QKD scheme involving the transmission of N -dimensional
quantum systems, where N is a prime power, in Section III
and prove its security against the most general eavesdropping
attack in Section IV. By standard Shor and Preskill reduction
argument, we arrive at the provably secure PM scheme using
unentangled N -dimensional quantum particles in Section V.
Since one may use n possibly entangled qubits to represent an
N -dimensional quantum state whenever N = 2n, we obtain
an unconditionally secure entangled-qubit-based (EQB) PM
QKD scheme. (See Section V for a discussion of a subtle
point in constructing this EQB PM QKD scheme. Moreover,
we emphasize that the term EQB means that the qubits used to
transfer information between Alice and Bob are entangled. In
contrast, the term EB means that entanglement shared between
Alice and Bob is explicitly used to generate the secret key.
Thus, an EQB scheme may not be an EB scheme.) This EQB
PM QKD scheme offers a definite advantage over all currently
known UQB ones used to combat Eve. Specifically, whenever
the most error-tolerant UQB PM QKD scheme known to date
(namely, the one introduced by Chau in Ref. [25]) can generate
a provably secure key under an eavesdropping attack, this
EQB scheme can also generate an equally secure key for any
2n ≥ 2 under the same attack. Furthermore, there is a family
of eavesdropping attacks that creates a bit error rate too high
for Chau’s scheme in Ref. [25] to generate a provably secure
key. In contrast, the same family of attacks does not prevent
this EQB PM scheme from producing a secure key whenever
2n ≥ 4. This observation convincingly demonstrates that
using entangled particles as information carriers can increase
error tolerance in QKD. Lastly, we give a brief summary in
Section VI.
3II. GENERAL FEATURES AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
FOR QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION
In QKD, we assume that Alice and Bob have access to two
communication channels. The first one is an insecure noisy
quantum channel. The other one is an unjammable noiseless
authenticated classical channel in which everyone, including
Eve, can listen to, but cannot alter, the content passing through
it. We also assume that Alice and Bob have complete control
over their own apparatus. Everything else for the unjammable
classical channel may be manipulated by the all powerful Eve.
We further make the most pessimistic assumption that Eve is
capable of performing any operation in her controlled territory
that is allowed by the known laws of quantum physics [5], [6].
Given an unjammable classical channel and an insecure
quantum channel, a QKD scheme consists of three stages [2].
The first is the signal preparation and transmission stage in
which quantum signals are prepared and exchanged between
Alice and Bob. The second is the signal quality test stage in
which a subset of the exchanged quantum signals is measured
in order to estimate the eavesdropping rate in the quantum
channel. The final phase is the signal privacy amplification
stage in which a carefully designed privacy amplification
procedure is performed to distill out an almost perfectly secure
key.
No QKD scheme can be 100% secure as Eve may be lucky
enough to guess the preparation or measurement bases for each
quantum state correctly. Hence, it is more reasonable to de-
mand that the mutual information between Eve’s measurement
results after eavesdropping and the final secret key is less than
an arbitrary but fixed small positive number. Hence we adopt
the following definition of security.
Definition 1 (Based on Lo and Chau [3]): With the above
assumptions on the unlimited computational power of Eve,
a QKD scheme is said to be unconditionally secure with
security parameters (ǫp, ǫI) provided that whenever Eve has a
cheating strategy that passes the signal quality control test with
probability greater than ǫp, the mutual information between
Eve’s measurement results from eavesdropping and the final
secret key is less than ǫI .
III. AN ENTANGLEMENT-BASED QUANTUM KEY
DISTRIBUTION SCHEME
In this section, we generalize the six-state scheme in a new
way. In Subsection III-A, we first identify each element in
SL(2, N), the special linear group of 2 × 2 matrices over
the finite field GF (N), with a distinct unitary operator in
U(N). It turns out that all Pauli errors occurring in the
transmitted particles can be depolarized by conjugating each
transmitted particle by a randomly and independently picked
unitary operator to be constructed. Then, in Subsection III-B,
we devise an EB QKD scheme based on this set of unitary
operators.
A. Construction Of The Unitary Operator T (M)
We begin with the following definitions.
Definition 2 (Ashikhmin and Knill [26]): Let a ∈ GF (N)
where N = pn with p being a prime. We define the unitary
operators Xa and Za acting on an N -dimensional Hilbert
space by
Xa|b〉 = |a+ b〉 (1)
and
Za|b〉 = χa(b)|b〉 ≡ ωTr(ab)p |b〉, (2)
where χa is an additive character of the finite field GF (N),
ωp is a primitive pth root of unity and Tr(a) = a+ap+ap
2
+
· · · + apn−1 is the absolute trace of a ∈ GF (N). Note that
the arithmetic inside the state ket and in the exponent of ωp
is performed in the finite field GF (N).
It is easy to see from Definition 2 that the set of all Pauli
errors acting on an N -dimensional particle {XaZb : a, b ∈
GF (N)} spans the set of all possible linear operators acting
on that particle over C. (Unless otherwise stated, all linear
operators discussed in this paper are endomorphisms.) Besides,
Xa and Zb follow the algebra
XaXb = XbXa = Xa+b, (3)
ZaZb = ZbZa = Za+b (4)
and
ZbXa = ω
Tr(ab)
p XaZb (5)
for all a, b ∈ GF (N), where arithmetic in the subscripts is
performed in GF (N).
One way to permute quantum errors is to construct a unitary
operator that maps XaZb to Xaα+bβZaδ+bγ modulo a phase
factor by conjugation. Specifically, let M =
[
α β
δ γ
]
∈
SL(2, N) where N = pn is a prime power. We look for a
unitary operator T (M) satisfying
T (M)−1XaZb T (M) = ω
fM (a,b)
p Xaα+bβZaδ+bγ (6)
for all a, b ∈ GF (N), where the arithmetic in the subscripts
is performed in GF (N) and the factor ωfM (a,b)p ∈ C satisfies
|ωfM (a,b)p | = 1. When the matrix M ∈ SL(2, N) is clearly
known to the readers, we shall simply denote T (M) by T
and fM by f .
The choice of T is not unique if it exists. This is because
eiθXcZdT also permutes quantum errors modulo a phase
factor for all θ ∈ R and c, d ∈ GF (N). (However, the phase
f(a, b) depends on the values c and d.)
Let us temporarily drop the invertibility requirement for T .
Applying the left hand side of Eq. (6) to the zero vector, we
have XaZbT 0 = ωf(a,b)p TXaα+bβZaδ+bγ0 = ωf(a,b)p T 0 for
all a, b ∈ GF (N). Thus, T 0 = 0 and hence the linear operator
T is well-defined (although it may not be invertible).
In contrast, an invertible T satisfying Eq. (6) does
not exist in general. To see this, we use Eqs. (3)–(6) to
manipulate the expression Xa+cZb+dT . On one hand,
Xa+cZb+dT = ω
f(a+c,b+d)
p TX(a+c)α+(b+d)βZ(a+c)δ+(b+d)γ.
On the other hand, Xa+cZb+dT = ω−Tr(bc)p XaZbXcZdT
= ω
f(c,d)−Tr(bc)
p XaZbTXcα+dβZcδ+dγ = ω
f(a,b)+f(c,d)
p
4ω
Tr([aδ+bγ][cα+dβ]−bc)
p TX(a+c)α+(b+d)βZ(a+c)δ+(b+d)γ.
Thus, the above two ways of expressing Xa+cZb+dT agree
for all a, b, c, d ∈ GF (N) is a necessary condition for the
existence of T−1; otherwise T is not injective as it maps a
non-zero vector to the zero vector.
It is tedious but straight-forward to check that the phase fac-
tor given in Eq. (7), together with the three phase conventions
(8)–(10) below satisfy the necessary condition for the existence
of T−1 stated in the above paragraph. More importantly, we
prove in Theorem 1 that the phase factor fM (a, b) defined in
this way makes T (M) invertible for all M ∈ SL(2, N). We
begin by writing down this particular phase factor fM (a, b)
below:
fM (a, b) =
1
2
Tr([a2αδ + b2βγ]) + Tr(abβδ) +
∆p2Tr(
∑
i>j
gigj [aiajαδ + bibjβγ]) (7)
for all a, b ∈ GF (N). Note that in Eq. (7), a = ∑ni=1 aigi
and b =
∑n
i=1 bigi where {g1, g2, . . . , gn} is a fixed basis of
GF (N) over the field GF (p) and ai, bi ∈ GF (p). Moreover,
∆p2 = 1 if p = 2 and ∆p2 = 0 if p 6= 2 in the above equation
is the Kronecker delta.
The phase conventions are chosen as follows. When p > 2
and hence N is odd, 2 is invertible in GF (N). Consequently,
the phase ωfM (a,b)p may be chosen from pth roots of unity.
Following this convention requires
fM (a, b) ∈ Z/pZ for any a, b ∈ GF (N) if 2 ∤ N. (8)
In contrast, when p = 2 and hence N is even, 2 is not invertible
in GF (N). Consequently, fM (a, b) may be integral or half-
integral; and ωfM (a,b)p ∈ {±1,±i}. In this case, we use the
convention
ω
Tr(g2ja
2
jαδ)/2
2 =
{
1 if Tr(g2ja2jαδ) = 0,
i if Tr(g2ja2jαδ) = 1,
(9)
and
ω
Tr(g2j b
2
jβγ)/2
2 =
{
1 if Tr(g2j b2jβγ) = 0,
i if Tr(g2j b2jβγ) = 1,
(10)
for all aj , bj ∈ GF (p), where j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
We explain why the last term in Eq. (7) is required. Recall
that the identity Tr(a2i + a2j)/2+ Tr(aiaj) = Tr([ai + aj ]2)/2
holds only for p > 2. In contrast, Tr(a2i +a2j) = Tr([ai+aj ]2)
for p = 2. So, we cannot use the first identity to absorb the
last term in Eq. (7) into the first term when p = 2.
Lemma 1: Suppose T (M) is a non-zero linear operator
obeying Eqs. (7)–(10) as well as the equation XaZb T (M) =
ω
fM (a,b)
p T (M)Xaα+bβZaδ+bγ for all a, b ∈ GF (N). Then
T (M) is invertible. Besides, T (M) is unitary after a proper
scaling. Specifically, T (M) is unitary if and only if its operator
norm satisfies ‖T (M)‖ = 1.
Proof: Clearly, T also satisfies the equation
T †Z−bX−a = ω
−f(a,b)
p Z−aδ−bγX−aα−bβT
†
.
From Eqs. (7)–(10), we know that
XaZbTT
† = ω
f(a,b)
p TXaα+bβZaδ+bγT
† =
ω
f(a,b)−Tr([aα+bβ][aδ+bγ])
p TZ
†
−aδ−bγX
†
−aα−bβT
† =
ω
f(a,b)+f(−a,−b)−Tr(a2αδ+b2βγ)−2Tr(abβδ)
p TT †XaZb =
TT †XaZb for all a, b ∈ GF (N). By the same argument,
XaZbT
†T = T †TXaZb for all a, b ∈ GF (N). Thus TT †
and T †T are non-zero operators belonging to the centralizer
of {∑a,b ΛabXaZb : Λab ∈ C}. In other words, TT † and
T †T are non-zero constant multiples of the identity operator.
Hence, T is invertible. Obviously, the invertible operator T is
unitary if and only if ‖T ‖ = 1.
Theorem 1: Let {g1, g2, . . . , gn} be a fixed basis of GF (N)
over GF (p). For any M =
[
α β
δ γ
]
∈ SL(2, N), the
unitary operator T (M) satisfying Eqs. (6)–(10) exists. A
possible choice of T (M) is
T (M) =
eiθ
Ndim(colspan(M−I))/2
∑
[a b]∈colspan(M−I)
ωTr(ϕM(a,b))p ×
ω
1
2
Tr(ϕ′M (a,b))
p XaZb (11)
for some θ ∈ R, with colspan(M − I) being the span of the
columns of (M − I). In the above equation, the functions
ϕM , ϕ
′
M : GF (N)×GF (N) −→ GF (N) are given by
ϕM (a, b)
= b[αa˜(a, b) + βb˜(a, b)]− ab˜(a, b)− αδa˜(a, b)2
− α(γ − 1)a˜(a, b)b˜(a, b)− β(γ − 1)b˜(a, b)2
+∆p2
∑
i>j
gigj[αδa˜i(a, b)a˜j(a, b)
+ βγb˜i(a, b)b˜j(a, b)] (12)
and
ϕ′M (a, b) = αδa˜(a, b)
2 + βγb˜(a, b)2 (13)
respectively. In Eqs. (12) and (13), a˜(a, b), b˜(a, b) ∈ GF (N)
and a˜i(a, b), b˜i(a, b) ∈ GF (p) are the solutions of the system
of equations
n∑
i=1
gia˜i(a, b) = a˜(a, b), (14)
n∑
i=1
gib˜i(a, b) = b˜(a, b) (15)
and [
α− 1 β
δ γ − 1
] [
a˜(a, b)
b˜(a, b)
]
=
[
a
b
]
. (16)
Proof: We show the existence of T by explicitly con-
structing it. We write T =
∑
i,j∈GF (N) ΛijXiZj for some
Λij ∈ C. Substituting this T into Eq. (6) and equating the
coefficient of XaZb, we obtain
Λab = ω
f(i,j)+Tr([iα+jβ]{b−iδ−j[γ−1]}−aj)
p ×
Λa−i(α−1)−jβ,b−iδ−j(γ−1) (17)
for all a, b, i, j ∈ GF (N). Using Eqs. (7)–(10), it is tedious
but straight-forward to check that Eq. (17) consists of N2,
N(N−1) and (N2−1) independent equations when (M−I)
is of rank 0, 1 and 2 respectively.
In what follows, we only consider the case det(M−I) 6= 0.
The other cases can be proven in a similar manner. Since
5N M T (M)
2
[
0 1
1 1
]
1
2
(I + iX1 + iZ1 +X1Z1)
3
[
1 1
1 2
]
1
3
2∑
a,b=0
ω
∆b0−∆a0
3 XaZb
3
[
1 2
2 2
]
1
3
2∑
a,b=0
ω
∆a0−∆b0
3 XaZb
4
[
0 1
1 ω
]
1
4
∑
a,b∈GF (4)
(−1)Tr(ω[a+b])/2+Tr(ω
2[a+b+b˜1b˜2])XaZb
TABLE I
THE OPERATOR T FOR A FEW M ’S IN THE CASE OF N = 2, 3 AND 4.
NOTE THAT ω ∈ GF (4) IN THE LAST ROW OF THE TABLE SATISFIES
ω2 + ω + 1 = 0.
(M − I) is invertible, dim(colspan(M − I)) = 2. Besides, the
solution of a˜(a, b), b˜(a, b) ∈ GF (N) and a˜i(a, b), b˜i(a, b) ∈
GF (p) in the system of Eqs. (14)–(16) exists and is unique
for any given a, b ∈ GF (N). Hence, by choosing these
a˜(a, b), b˜(a, b), a˜i(a, b), b˜i(a, b), we may use the (N2 − 1)
independent equations taken from Eq. (17) to relate every Λab
to Λ00 for all (a, b) 6= (0, 0). In this way, we conclude that
every Λab is proportional to Λ00. Besides, all |Λab|’s are equal.
Consequently, from Lemma 1, the unitarity of T (M) implies
that |Λ00| = 1/N . Substituting a˜(a, b), b˜(a, b) into Eqs. (6)–
(10) and (17), we arrive at Eqs. (11)–(13).
For the purpose of illustration, the unitary operators T (M)’s
for a few M ’s computed by Eqs. (8)–(13) are listed in Table I.
Incidentally, the unitary operator T (M) listed in Table I for
N = 2 is, up to a global phase, the same as the one used by
Lo in his security proof of the six-state scheme in Ref. [23].
Furthermore, it is shown in Theorem 8 in the Appendix that
the first three operators listed in Table I are of great importance
in the construction of QKD schemes for N = 2, 3.
The unitary operator T (M) stated in Theorem 1 depends
on the matrix M ∈ SL(2, N). So we may regard T as a map
from SL(2, N) to U(N). Let Mi =
[
αi βi
δi γi
]
∈ SL(2, N)
for i = 1, 2. Suppose further that N is odd. From Eq. (7),
it follows that fM1M2(a, b) = fM1(aα2 + bβ2, aδ2 + bγ2) +
fM2(a, b) for all a, b ∈ GF (N). In other words, T (M1M2) =
T (M2)T (M1). Hence the map T : SL(2, N) −→ U(N)
defines a faithful transposed representation of SL(2, N) for
all odd N . As SL(2, N) is generated by two elements for any
prime power N [27], Alice and Bob may apply any T (M) if
they can apply the two specific unitary operators corresponding
to the generators of SL(2, N). In contrast, when N is even,
T is not a group representation of SL(2, N). Fortunately,
readers will find out in Section III that the security of all
the QKD schemes reported in this paper do not depend on
the phase fM (a, b). Therefore, in practice, Alice and Bob
may replace T (M1M2 · · ·Mk) used in the QKD schemes
reported in this paper by T (Mk)T (Mk−1) · · ·T (M1) in which
Mi’s are chosen from the two generators of SL(2, N). (Note
that the unitary operator defined in this way may depend
on the decomposition of a matrix in SL(2, N) into factors
of Mi’s. However, the unitary operator defined by any such
decomposition will work equally well.)
B. An Entanglement-Based Quantum Key Distribution Scheme
EB QKD Scheme A
1) Let the Hilbert space dimension N of each quantum
particle involved in this scheme be a prime power. Alice
prepares L ≫ 1 quantum particle pairs in the state∑
i∈GF (N) |ii〉/
√
N . She randomly and independently
applies a unitary transformation T (M) ∈ T [SL(2, N)]
to the second particle in each pair. She keeps the first
particle and sends the second in each pair to Bob. Bob
acknowledges the receipt of these particles and then
applies a randomly and independently picked T (M ′)−1
to each received particle. Now, Alice and Bob publicly
reveal their unitary transformations applied to each parti-
cle. A shared pair is then kept and is said to be in the set
SM if Alice and Bob have applied T (M) and T (M)−1
to the second particle of the shared pair respectively.
Thus in the absence of noise and Eve, each pair of shared
particles kept by Alice and Bob should be in the state∑
i∈GF (N) |ii〉/
√
N .
2) Alice and Bob estimate the channel error rate by sacrific-
ing a few particle pairs. Specifically, they randomly pick
O([N + 1]2 log{N [N2 − 1]/ǫ}/δ2N2) pairs from each
of the N(N2−1) sets SM and measure each particle of
the pair in the {|i〉 : i ∈ GF (N)} basis, namely the
standard basis. They publicly announce and compare
their measurement results. In this way, they know the
estimated channel error rate to within δ with probability
at least (1 − ǫ). (A detailed proof of this claim can be
found in Ref. [2]. A brief outline of the proof will also
be given in Subsection IV-B for handy reference.) If the
channel error rate is too high, they abort the scheme and
start all over again.
3) Alice and Bob perform the following privacy amplifi-
cation procedure. (It will be shown in Section IV that
step 3a below reduces errors of the form XaZb with
a 6= 0 at the expense of increasing errors of the form Zc
with c 6= 0. In contrast, step 3b below reduces errors of
the form XaZb with b 6= 0 at the expense of increasing
errors of the form Xc with c 6= 0. Applying steps 3a
and 3b in turn is an effective way to reduce all kinds
of quantum errors provided that the error rate is not too
high.)
a) Alice and Bob apply the entanglement purifica-
tion procedure by two-way classical communi-
cation (LOCC2 EP) similar to the one reported
in Refs. [21], [28]. Specifically, Alice and Bob
randomly group their remaining quantum particles
in tetrads where each tetrad consists of two pairs
shared by Alice and Bob in Step 1. Alice randomly
picks one of the two particles in her share of each
tetrad as the control register and the other as the
target. She applies the following unitary operation
6to the control and target registers:
|i〉control ⊗ |j〉target 7−→ |i〉control ⊗ |j − i〉target, (18)
where the subtraction is performed in the finite
field GF (N). Bob applies the same unitary trans-
formation to his corresponding share of particles
in the tetrad. Then, they publicly announce the
measurement results of their target registers in
the standard basis. They keep their control regis-
ters only when the measurement results of their
corresponding target registers agree. They repeat
the above LOCC2 EP procedure until there is an
integer r > 0 such that a single application of
step 3b will bring the signal quantum error rate of
the resultant particles down to less than ǫI/ℓ2 for
an arbitrary but fixed security parameter ǫI > 0,
where rℓ is the number of remaining pairs they
share currently. They abort the scheme either when
r is greater than the number of remaining quantum
pairs they possess or when they have used up all
their quantum particles in this procedure.
b) They apply the majority vote phase error correction
(PEC) procedure introduced by Gottesman and Lo
[24]. Specifically, Alice and Bob randomly divide
the resultant particles into sets each containing
r pairs of particles shared by Alice and Bob.
Alice and Bob jointly apply the [r, 1, r]N phase
error correction procedure to their corresponding
shares of r particles in each set and retain their
phase error corrected quantum particles. At this
point, Alice and Bob should share ℓ almost per-
fect pairs
∑
i∈GF (N) |ii〉/
√
N with fidelity at least
(1− ǫI/ℓ). By measuring their shared pairs in the
standard basis, Alice and Bob obtain their common
key. More importantly, Eve’s information on this
common key is less than the security parameter ǫI .
(Proof of this claim can be found in Theorem 3 in
Subsection IV-C below.)
One may simplify Scheme A by picking T (M)’s from
T [H ], where H is a proper subgroup of SL(2, N) whose
number of elements divides (N2 − 1). Theorem 8 in the
Appendix tells us that the subgroup H exists if and only if
N = 2, 3, 5, 7, 11 and |H | = N2 − 1. From now on, we use
the symbol G to denote either the entire group SL(2, N) or
the order (N2 − 1) subgroup H of SL(2, N).
In the case N = 2 and G equals the cyclic group of three
elements, Scheme A is a variation of the six-state scheme
introduced by Chau in Ref. [25]. The key difference is that,
unlike the former one, the present scheme does not make use
of Calderbank-Shor-Steane quantum code after PEC.
Lemma 3 in Subsection IV-C shows that all Pauli errors
in the quantum signal right after step 1 in Scheme A are
depolarized. Furthermore, Theorem 8 in the Appendix shows
that the same conclusion applies when Alice and Bob pick M
from a subgroup H of SL(2, N) of order (N2 − 1).
IV. CRYPTANALYSIS OF THE ENTANGLEMENT-BASED
QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION SCHEME
In this section, we present a detailed unconditional security
proof of Scheme A in the limit of a large number of quantum
particles L transmitted. We also investigate the maximum error
tolerance rate of Scheme A against the most general type of
eavesdropping attack allowed by the laws of quantum physics.
With suitable modifications, the security proof reported here
can be extended to the case of a small finite L. Nevertheless,
working in the limit of large L makes the asymptotic error
tolerance rate analysis easier.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. In
Subsection IV-A, we define various error rate measures and
discuss how to fairly compare error tolerance capabilities
between different QKD schemes. Then in Subsection IV-B,
we briefly explain why a reliable upper bound of the channel
error can be obtained by randomly testing only a small subset
of quantum particles in step 2 of Scheme A. Finally in Subsec-
tion IV-C, we prove the security of the privacy amplification
procedure in step 3 of Scheme A and analyze its error tolerance
rate. This will complete the proof of unconditional security for
EB Scheme A.
A. Fair Comparison Of Error Tolerance Capability And Var-
ious Measures Of Error Rates
Definition 3: Recall that Alice prepares L particle pairs
each in the state
∑
i∈GF (N) |ii〉/
√
N and randomly applies
T (M) ∈ T [G] to the second particle in each pair. We denote
the resultant (pure) state of the pairs by ⊗Lj=1 |φj〉. Then, she
sends one particle in each pair through an insecure quantum
channel to Bob; and upon receipt, Bob randomly applies
T (M ′)−1 to his share of the pair. The channel quantum
error rate in this situation is defined as the marginal error
rate of the measurement results if Alice and Bob were to
make an hypothetical measurement on the jth shared quantum
particle pair in the basis {I ⊗ XaZb|φj〉 : a, b ∈ GF (N)}
for all j. In other words, the channel quantum error rate
equals 1/L times the expectation value of the cardinality of the
set {j : hypothetical measurement of the jth pair equals I ⊗
XaZb|φj〉 with (a, b) 6= (0, 0)}. The channel stan-
dard basis measurement error rate is defined as 1/L
times the expectation value of the cardinality of the set
{j : hypothetical measurement of the jth pair equals I ⊗
XaZb|φj〉 with a 6= 0}. The next two definitions concern
only those quantum particle pairs retained by Alice and
Bob in
⋃
M∈G SM . (That is, those that Alice and Bob have
applied T (M) and T (M)−1 to the second particle of the
shared pair for some M ∈ G respectively.) In the absence
of noise and Eve, all such particle pairs should be in the
state
∑
i∈GF (N) |ii〉/
√
N . The signal quantum error rate
(or quantum error rate (QER) for short) in this situation
is defined as the expectation value of the proportion of
particle pairs in
⋃
M SM whose measurement result in the
basis {∑i∈GF (N) |i〉 ⊗ XaZb|i〉/√N : a, b ∈ GF (N)}
equals
∑
i∈GF (N) |i〉⊗XaZb|i〉/
√
N for some (a, b) 6= (0, 0).
The signal standard basis measurement error rate (or
7standard basis measurement error rate (SBMER) for short) is
defined as the expectation value of the proportion of particle
pairs in
⋃
M SM whose measurement result in the basis
{∑i∈GF (N) |i〉 ⊗ XaZb|i〉/√N : a, b ∈ GF (N)} equals∑
i∈GF (N) |i〉⊗XaZb|i〉/
√
N for some a 6= 0. In other words,
SBMER measures the apparent error rate of the signal when
Alice and Bob measure their respective shares of particles in
the standard basis. In the special case of N = 2n, any standard
basis measurement result can be bijectively mapped to an n-bit
string. Thus, it makes sense to define the signal bit error rate
(or bit error rate (BER) for short) as the marginal error rate of
the n-bit string resulting from a standard basis measurement of
the signal at the end of the signal preparation and transmission
stage.
Three important remarks are in place. First, SBMERs and
BERs of QKD schemes using quantum particles of different
dimensions as information carriers should never be compared
directly. This is because the quantum communication channels
used are different. In addition, the same eavesdropping strategy
may lead to different error rates [13], [14], [15], [16], [18].
It appears that the only sensible situation in which it is
meaningful compare the error tolerance capabilities of two
QKD schemes is when the schemes are using the same
quantum communication channel and are subjected to the
same eavesdropping attack. Specifically, let Alice reversibly
map every pn-dimensional quantum state used in Scheme A
into n possibly entangled p-dimensional quantum particles
and send them through an insecure p-dimensional quantum
particle communication channel to Bob. Moreover, since we
assume that Alice and Bob do not have quantum storage
capability, it is reasonable to require that Alice prepares and
sends packets of n possibly entangled p-dimensional quantum
particles one after another. In this way, Scheme A becomes an
entangled-particle-based QKD scheme. More importantly, Eve
may apply the same eavesdropping attack on the insecure p-
dimensional quantum particle channel used by Alice and Bob
irrespective of the value n. Thus, it is fair to compare the er-
ror tolerance capability between two entangled-particle-based
QKD schemes derived from Scheme A using pn- and pn′ -
dimensional particles respectively against any eavesdropping
attack on the p-dimensional quantum particle channel.
Second, the BER defined above for N = 2n with n > 1
depends on the bijection used. Fortunately, in Subsection IV-C,
readers will find that the BER for the QKD scheme reported
in this paper is independent of this bijection.
Third, Lemma 3 in Subsection IV-C and Theorem 8 in the
Appendix show that Pauli errors that occurred in a collection
of N -dimensional quantum registers are depolarized if we
conjugate each register by a randomly and independently
picked T (M) ∈ T [G]. Furthermore, the channel quantum error
rate is equal to the QER of the signal. Roughly speaking, QER
refers to the rate of any quantum error (phase shift and/or spin
flip) occurring in the pair ∑i∈GF (N) |ii〉/√N shared by Alice
and Bob. In contrast, the depolarization of Pauli errors implies
that the channel standard basis measurement error rate does
not equal the SBMER in general.
B. Reliability Of The Error Rate Estimation
In Scheme A, Alice and Bob keep only those particle pairs
that are believed to be in the state
∑
i∈GF (N) |ii〉/
√
N at the
end of step 1. Then, they measure some of them in the standard
basis in the signal quality control test in step 2. More impor-
tantly, since all the LOCC2 EP and PEC privacy amplification
procedures in step 3 map standard basis to standard basis, we
can imagine that the final standard basis measurements of their
shared secret key were performed right at the beginning of
step 3. In this way, any quantum eavesdropping strategy used
by Eve is reduced to a classical probabilistic cheating strategy.
In other words, for any quantum eavesdropping strategy, one
can always find an equivalent Pauli attack that has the same
probability of passing the signal quality control test in step 2
and gives the same density matrix of the shared quantum
particles just before the final standard basis measurement in
step 3. Therefore, we need only to consider Pauli attack in the
subsequent analysis [3].
Recall that in step 2, Alice and Bob do not care about
the measurement result of an individual quantum register;
they only care about the difference between the measurement
outcome of Alice and the corresponding outcome of Bob. In
other words, they apply the projection operator
Pa =
∑
i∈GF (N)
|i, i+ a〉 〈i, i+ a| (19)
to each of the randomly selected quantum registers in the
set
⋃
M∈G SM . The projection operator Pa can be rewritten
in a form involving Bell-like states as follows. Define |Φab〉
to be the Bell-like state
∑
i∈GF (N) |i〉 ⊗ XaZb|i〉/
√
N ≡∑
i∈GF (N) ω
Tr(ib)
p |i, i + a〉/
√
N . Then, Pa can be rewritten
as
Pa =
∑
b∈GF (N)
|Φab〉 〈Φab|. (20)
Since every particle pair in SM is subjected to T (M) and
T (M)−1 before and after passing through the insecure channel
respectively, Pa is a measure of whether an error of the form
T (M)XaZbT (M)
−1 for some b ∈ GF (N) has occurred in
this pair. Recall that M ∈ G is randomly and independently
chosen for each pair. Moreover, such a choice is known to
Eve after the second half of the particle pair has reached Bob.
So, combined with Eqs. (6) and (19)–(20), the signal quality
control test in step 2 of Scheme A can be regarded as an
effective random sampling test for the fidelity of the pairs as
|Φ00〉 ≡
∑
i∈GF (N) |ii〉/
√
N .
At this point, classical sampling theory can be used to esti-
mate the quantum channel error and hence the eavesdropping
rate of the classical probabilistic cheating strategy used by
Eve, as well as the fidelity of the remaining pairs as |Φ00〉.
Lemma 2 (Adapted from Lo, Chau and Ardehali [2]):
Suppose that immediately after step 1 in Scheme A, Alice
and Bob share LM pairs of particles in the set SM , namely,
those particles that were conjugated by T (M). Suppose further
that Alice and Bob randomly pick O(log[1/ǫ]/δ2) . 0.01LM
of the LM pairs for testing in step 2. Define the estimated
channel standard basis measurement error rate eˆM to be the
8portion of tested pairs whose measurement results obtained
by Alice and Bob differ. Denote the channel standard basis
measurement error rate for the set SM by eM . Then, the
probability that |eM − eˆM | > δ is of the order of ǫ for any
fixed δ > 0.
Proof: Using earlier discussions in this subsection, the
problem depicted in this lemma is equivalent to a classical
random sampling problem without replacement whose solution
follows directly from Lemma 1 in Ref. [2].
Lemma 2 assures that by randomly choosing O(log[1/ǫ]/δ2)
out of LM pairs to test, the unbiased estimator eˆM cannot
differ significantly from the actual channel standard basis
measurement error rate eM . More importantly, the number
of particle pairs they need to test is independent of LM .
Therefore, in the limit of large LM (and hence large L), ran-
domly testing a negligibly small portion of quantum particle
pairs is sufficient for Alice and Bob to estimate the channel
standard basis measurement error rate in the set SM with high
confidence [2]. In addition, the QER of the remaining untested
particle pairs is the same as that of
⋃
M∈G SM in the large L
limit.
Theorem 2: Let G denote the group SL(2, N) or its order
(N2 − 1) subgroup H reported in Theorem 8. Using the
notation in Lemma 2, (N +1) 〈eˆM 〉 /N is a reliable estimator
of the upper bound of the QER, where 〈·〉 denotes the mean
averaged over all M ∈ G. Specifically, the probability that the
QER exceeds (N + 1)(〈eˆM 〉+ δ)/N is less than ǫ|G|.
Proof: Recall that Eve does not know the choice of
unitary operators applied by Alice and Bob in step 1 in
Scheme A. Consequently, by Lemma 3 in Subsection IV-C or
Theorem 8 in the Appendix, step 1 in Scheme A depolarizes
Pauli errors of the quantum particles. That is to say, in the
limit of a large L, the XaZb error rate in the set SI is
equal to that of T (M)−1XaZbT (M) in the set SM for all
M ∈ G. Among the T (M)−1XaZbT (M) ≡ ωfM (a,b)p XcZd
errors occurring in the set SM , only those with c 6= 0 can be
recorded in step 2. Thus, the estimator for the QER equals
(N2− 1) 〈eˆM 〉 /N(N − 1) = (N +1) 〈eˆM 〉 /N . This theorem
now follows directly from Lemma 2.
To summarize, once the signal quality control test in step 2
of Scheme A is passed, Alice and Bob have high confidence
(of at least (1 − ǫ)) that the QER of the remaining untested
particle pairs is small enough for the signal privacy amplifica-
tion stage in step 3 to handle. Moreover, the estimation given
in Theorem 2 is independent of the phase fM (a, b) used by
the unitary operator T (M).
Before drawing a close to this subsection, we would like to
point out that one can estimate the QER in a more aggressive
way. Specifically, Alice and Bob do not only know whether the
measurement results of each tested pair are equal, in fact they
also know the difference between their measurement results
in each tested pair. They may exploit this extra piece of
information to better estimate the probability of XaZb error
in the signal for each a, b ∈ GF (N). Such estimation helps
them to devise tailor-made privacy amplification schemes that
tackle the specific kind of error caused by channel noise and
Eve. While this methodology will be useful in practical QKD,
we shall not pursue this further here as the aim of this paper
is the worst-case cryptanalysis in the limit of a large number
of quantum particle transfers L.
C. Security Of Privacy Amplification
Definition 4: We denote the XaZb error rate of the quantum
particles shared by Alice and Bob just before step 3 in
Scheme A by ea,b. When there is no possible confusion in
the subscript, we shall write eab instead of ea,b. Similarly, we
denote the XaZb error rate of the resultant quantum particles
shared by them after k rounds of LOCC2 EP by ek EPa,b or ek EPab .
Suppose further that Alice and Bob perform PEC using the
[r, 1, r]N majority vote code after k rounds of LOCC2 EP.
We denote the resultant XaZb error rate by ePECa,b or ePECab .
Lemma 3: Let G = SL(2, N). The signal quantum error
suffered by quantum particle pairs in
⋃
E∈SL(2,N) can be
regarded as depolarized. In other words, the QER satisfies∑
i,j∈GF (N)
eij = 1 (21)
and
eab = ea′b′ for all (a, b), (a′, b′) 6= (0, 0). (22)
Proof: Recall that Alice and Bob randomly and in-
dependently apply T (M) and T (M ′)−1 to each transmitted
quantum register. More importantly, their choices are unknown
to Eve when the quantum particle is traveling in the insecure
channel. Let E be the quantum operation that Eve applies to the
quantum particles in the set
⋃
M∈SL(2,N) SM . (In other words,
E is a completely positive convex-linear map acting on the
set of density matrices describing the quantum particle pairs
to which Alice and Bob have applied T (M) and T (M)−1
respectively for some M ∈ SL(2, N). Moreover, 0 ≤
Tr(E(ρ)) ≤ 1 for any density matrix ρ.) After Alice and Bob
have publicly announced their choices of quantum operations,
every quantum particle pair in
⋃
M SM has an equal chance of
having experienced [⊗jT (Mj)−1]E [⊗jT (Mj)] where Mj ∈
SL(2, N). Note that the index j in the tensor product in the
above expression runs over all particle pairs in
⋃
M SM . From
the discussions in Subsection IV-B, we know that Eve’s attack
may be reduced to a classical probabilistic one. In other words,
we may regard E as a Pauli error operator. Since SL(2, N)
is a group and the set {M ∈ SL(2, N) : M [a b]t = [c d]t}
contains N elements for all [a b], [c d] 6= [0 0], we conclude
from Eq. (6) that the Pauli quantum error of the quantum
particles in the set
⋃
M∈SL(2,N) SM is depolarized. Hence,
Eqs. (21) and (22) apply.
After establishing the initial conditions for the QER, we
investigate the effect of LOCC2 EP on the QER.
Lemma 4: In the limit of a large number of transmitted
quantum registers, ek EPab is given by
ek EPab =
∑
c0,...,c2k−2
eac0eac1 · · · eac2k−2ea,b−c0−c1−···−c2k−2∑
i∈GF (N)
(∑
j∈GF (N) eij
)2k .
(23)
9In particular, if eab’s are given by Eqs. (21) and (22), then
ek EP00 =
[e00 + (N − 1)e01]2
k
+ (N − 1) (e00 − e01)2
k
N
{
[e00 + (N − 1)e01]2k + (N − 1)N2ke2k01
} ,
(24)
ek EP0b =
[e00 + (N − 1)e01]2
k − (e00 − e01)2
k
N
{
[e00 + (N − 1)e01]2
k
+ (N − 1)N2ke2k01
} (25)
for all b 6= 0 and
ek EPab =
N2
k
e2
k
01
N
{
[e00 + (N − 1)e01]2
k
+ (N − 1)N2ke2k01
} (26)
for all a, b ∈ GF (N) with a 6= 0.
Proof: Suppose that Bob’s control and target registers
experience XaZb and Xa′Zb′ errors respectively. (In contrast,
those retained by Alice are error-free as they never passed
through the insecure noisy channel.) After applying the unitary
operation in Eq. (18), the errors in the control and target
registers become XaZb+b′ and Xa′−aZb′ respectively.
Recall that the privacy amplification procedure in step 3 is
performed irrespective of which set SM the particle belongs
to. So, in the limit of a large number of transmitted quantum
registers, the covariance between probabilities of picking any
two distinct quantum registers tends to zero. Likewise, the
covariance between probabilities of picking any two distinct
pairs of quantum registers also tends to zero. Hence, in this
limit, the expectation value of the XaZb error rate just after
applying the unitary operation in Eq. (18) can be computed
by assuming that the error in every pair of control and target
registers is independent. Moreover, the variance of the XaZb
error rate tends to zero in this limit.
To show that Eq. (23) is valid, let us recall that Alice and
Bob keep their control registers only when the measurement
results of their corresponding target registers agree. In other
words, they keep a control register only when a = a′. Thus,
once the control register in Bob’s laboratory is kept, it will suf-
fer an error XdZc where d = a and c = b+b′. Therefore, in the
limit of a large number of transmitted quantum registers, the
number of quantum registers remaining after (k+1) rounds of
LOCC2 EP is proportional to
∑
i∈GF (N)(
∑
j∈GF (N) e
k EP
ij )
2
.
Similarly, the number of quantum registers suffering from
XaZb errors after (k+1) rounds of LOCC2 EP is proportional
to
∑
c∈GF (N) e
k EP
ac e
k EP
a,b−c. Furthermore, the two proportional-
ity constants are the same. Therefore,
e
(k+1) EP
ab =
∑
c∈GF (N) e
k EP
ac e
k EP
a,b−c∑
i∈GF (N)
(∑
j∈GF (N) e
k EP
ij
)2 (27)
for all k ∈ N. Eq. (23) can then be proven by mathematical
induction on k. (It is easier to use mathematical induction to
prove the validity of the numerator in Eq. (23) and then use
Eq. (21) to determine the denominator.)
In particular, if the initial error rates eab’s are given by
Eqs. (21) and (22), then Eqs. (24)–(26) can be proven by
mathematical induction on k with the help of Eq. (27).
Lemma 4 generalizes a similar result for qubits [24], [25].
In fact, the effect of LOCC2 EP is to reduce errors of the
form XaZb with a 6= 0 at the expense of possibly increasing
errors of the form Zc with c 6= 0. We further remark that in
the case where L is finite, ek EPab is determined by solving the
classical problem of randomly pairing N2 kinds of balls in an
urn containing 2rℓ balls. Therefore, ek EPab is related to the so-
called multivariate hypergeometric distribution whose theory
is reviewed extensively in Ref. [29].
Lemma 5: In the limit of a large number of quantum
particles transmitted from Alice to Bob, the XaZb error rate
after PEC ePECab using [r, 1, r]N majority vote code satisfies∑
a 6=0
∑
b∈GF (N)
ePECab ≤ r
∑
a 6=0
∑
b∈GF (N)
ek EPab . (28)
Moreover, if eab’s satisfy Eqs. (21), (22) and e00 > e01, then∑
a∈GF (N)
∑
b6=0
ePECab
≤ (N − 1)
{
1− N (e00 − e01)
2k+1
4 [e00 + (N − 1)e01]2
k+1
}r
(29)
as k →∞. This inequality also holds if r depends on k.
Proof: Recall that the parity check matrix of the [r, 1, r]N
majority vote code is

1 −1
1 −1
.
.
.
.
.
.
1 −1

 . (30)
Therefore, after measuring the (phase) error syndrome, the
Zb error stays with the control register whereas the Xa error
propagates from the control as well as all target registers to
the resultant control quantum register [30]. Specifically, let the
error in the ith quantum register be XaiZbi for i = 1, 2, . . . , r.
Then, after measuring the error syndrome, the resultant error
in the remaining control register equals Xa1+···+arZb1 . Con-
sequently, after PEC, the error in the remaining register is
Xa1+···+arZb where b is the majority of bi (i = 1, 2, . . . , r).
In other words, after PEC, spin flip error rates are increased
by at most r times. Hence, Eq. (28) holds.
By the same argument used in Lemma 4, in the limit of a
large number of transferred quantum registers, the rate of any
kind of phase error after PEC,
∑
a∈GF (N)
∑
b6=0 e
PEC
ab , satisfies∑
a∈GF (N)
∑
b6=0
ePECab
≤ (N − 1)max{Pr (the number of registers suffering
from error of the form XiZ1 is greater than or
equal to those suffering from error of the form Xi
when drawn from a random sample of r registers,
given a fixed e00)}, (31)
where the maximum is taken over all possible probabilities
with different eab’s satisfying the constraints in Eqs. (21)
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and (22). We denote the sum ∑a∈GF (N) ek EPab by ek EPZb . Then,∑
a∈GF (N)
∑
b6=0
ePECab
≤ (N − 1)max{
r∑
s=0
(
r
s
)
(1 − ek EPZ0 − ek EPZ1 )r−s ×
(ek EPZ0 + e
k EP
Z1 )
s Pr(the number of registers suffering
from error of the form XiZ1 is greater than or
equal to those suffering from error of the from Xi
when drawn from a random sample of s registers,
given that these s registers are suffering from error
of the form XiZb for b = 0, 1, for a fixed e00)}
≤ (N − 1)max{
r∑
s=0
(
r
s
)
(1 − ek EPZ0 − ek EPZ1 )r−s ×
(ek EPZ0 + e
k EP
Z1 )
s exp

−2s
(
1
2
− e
k EP
Z1
ek EPZ0 + e
k EP
Z1
)2}
= (N − 1)max{{1− (ek EPZ0 + ek EPZ1 )×[
e−2[1/2−e
k EP
Z1
/(ek EPZ0 +e
k EP
Z1
)]2 − 1
]}r
}
≤ (N − 1)max{[1− 2t(ek EPZ0 + ek EPZ1 )×(
1
2
− e
k EP
Z1
ek EPZ0 + e
k EP
Z1
)2
r
} (32)
where t→ 1 as k →∞. Note that we have used Eq. (1.2.5) in
Ref. [31] to arrive at the second inequality above. (Eq. (1.2.5)
is applicable because the assumption that e00 > e01 leads to
ek EPZ0 > e
k EP
Z1
for a sufficiently large k.) It is straight-forward
to check that Eq. (32) remains valid if r depends on k.
Since e00 > e01, (
∑
b∈GF (N) e0b)
2k = [e00+(N−1)e01]2k
is the dominant term in the common denominator of Eqs. (24)–
(26) when k is sufficiently large, Eq. (29) follows directly from
Eqs. (24)–(26) and (32).
The above theorem tells us that the effect of PEC is to
reduce errors of the form XaZb with b 6= 0 at the expense of
possibly increasing errors of the form Xc with c 6= 0. For this
reason, powerful signal privacy amplification procedures can
be constructed by suitably combining LOCC2 EP and PEC.
Now, we prove the unconditional security of Scheme A.
Theorem 3: Let N = pn be a prime power, and let ǫp, ǫI
and δ be three arbitrarily small but fixed positive numbers.
Define
eQER =
(N2 − 1)(2N + 1−√5)
2N(N2 +N − 1) . (33)
The EB QKD Scheme A involving the transfer of N -
dimensional quantum particles is unconditionally secure with
security parameters (ǫp, ǫI) when the number of quantum
register transfers L ≡ L(ǫp, ǫI , δ) is sufficiently large. Specifi-
cally, provided that Alice and Bob abort the scheme whenever
the estimated QER in step 2 is greater than (eQER − δ), the
secret key generated by Alice and Bob is provably secure in the
L → ∞ limit. In fact, if Eve uses an eavesdropping strategy
with at least ǫp chance of passing the signal quality test stage
in step 2, the mutual information between Eve’s measurement
results after eavesdropping and the final secret key is less than
ǫI . In this respect, Scheme A tolerates asymptotically up to a
QER of eQER.
Proof: By picking L≫ (N + 1)2|G| log(|G|/ǫp)/δ2N2
and applying Lemma 2 and Theorem 2, we conclude that by
testing O([N + 1]2 log[ |G|/ǫp]/δ2N2) pairs in each set SM ,
any eavesdropping strategy that causes a QER higher than eQER
has less than ǫp chance of passing the signal quality test stage
in step 2 of Scheme A. (Similarly, if the QER is less than
(eQER − 2δ), it has at least (1− ǫp) chance of passing step 2.
As δ can be chosen to be arbitrarily small, the signal quality
test stage in step 2 of Scheme A is not overly conservative.)
Now, suppose that Alice and Bob arrive at the signal privacy
amplification stage in step 3 of Scheme A. Since L→∞, the
quantum particle pairs used in the signal quality test stage
in step 2 do not affect the error rates eab’s of the remaining
untested particle pairs.
From the discussions in Subsection IV-B, we only need to
consider the case when Eve uses a classical cheating strategy.
Hence, the initial error rates eab’s satisfy Eqs. (21) and (22).
After applying k rounds of LOCC2 EP, Alice and Bob may
consider picking r used in the majority vote PEC to be
r ≈ ǫI [e00 + (N − 1)e01]
2k
2ℓ(N − 1)N2ke2k01
, (34)
where ℓ is the number of quantum particle pairs Alice and
Bob share immediately after the PEC procedure in step 3b.
Provided that e00 > e01, in the k → ∞ limit, r → ∞. So,
from Eqs. (28) and (29) in Lemma 5, the QER of the remaining
quantum registers after PEC, efinal, is upper-bounded by
efinal
<
ǫI
2ℓ
+ (N − 1)×
exp
{
−ǫIN(e00 − e01)2k+1
8ℓ(N − 1)N2ke2k01 [e00 + (N − 1)e01]2
k
}
.(35)
In other words, efinal < ǫI/ℓ provided that
(e00 − e01)2 > Ne01 [e00 + (N − 1)e01] . (36)
This condition is satisfied if and only if
e00 >
N2 + 1 + (N2 − 1)√5
2N(N2 +N − 1) . (37)
It is easy to verify that the constraint in Eq. (37) is consistent
with the assumption that e00 > e01. Hence, provided that the
initial QER satisfies∑
(a,b) 6=(0,0)
eab <
(N2 − 1)(2N + 1−√5)
2N(N2 +N − 1) = e
QER, (38)
the fidelity of the ℓ quantum particle pairs shared between
Alice and Bob immediately before they perform standard basis
measurements to obtain their secret key is at least 1− efinal >
1− ǫI/ℓ. By Footnote 28 in Ref. [3], the mutual information
between Eve’s final measurement result after eavesdropping
and the final secret key is at most ǫI . Thus, provided Alice and
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N Tolerable SBMER Tolerable BER
2 27.64% 27.64%
3 43.31% N.A.
4 53.40% 35.60%
5 60.44% N.A.
7 69.62% N.A.
8 72.78% 41.59%
9 75.34% N.A.
11 79.25% N.A.
13 82.09% N.A.
16 85.14% 45.41%
TABLE II
THE TOLERABLE SBMER AND BER FOR SCHEME A AND HENCE ALSO
SCHEMES B AND C FOR N ≤ 16. AS POINTED OUT IN THE TEXT, THE
VALUES OF SBMER AND BER SHOULD NOT BE COMPARED DIRECTLY.
Bob abort the scheme if the estimated QER in step 2 exceeds
(eQER − δ), the secret key generated is provably secure. That
is to say, the scheme is unconditionally secure with security
parameters (ǫp, ǫI).
A few remarks are in order. First, as Scheme A reduces any
kind of eavesdropping attacks in the channel to a classical
cheating strategy which in turn is reduced to depolarization
of the quantum signal, the ratio of the QER to the SBMER
is given by (N + 1) : N . From Theorem 3, the maximum
tolerable SBMER for Scheme A equals
eSBMER =
(N2 − 1)(2N + 1−√5)
2(N + 1)(N2 +N − 1) . (39)
In addition, if p = 2, Lemma 3 implies that no matter what
bijective map Alice and Bob use to convert their standard basis
2n-dimensional quantum particle measurement results into an
n-bit string, the probability that exactly i out of n consecutive
measured bits are in error equals 2ne01
(
n
i
)
for all 0 ≤
i ≤ n. Consequently, the BER equals 2ne01
∑n
i=0
(
n
i
)
i/n =
22n−1e01; and the maximum tolerable BER for Scheme A is
given by
eBER =
N(2N + 1−√5)
4(N2 +N − 1) . (40)
We tabulate the tolerable SBMER and BER in Table II.
However, we must emphasize once again that according to the
discussions in Subsection IV-A, we cannot deduce the relative
error tolerance capability from Table II.
Second, we study the tolerable error rate of Scheme A as a
function of N . Table II shows that the maximum tolerable BER
eBER for N = 2 is the same as the one obtained earlier by Chau
in Ref. [25]. Additionally, eSBMER increases as N increases.
In fact, the tolerable SBMER and BER tend to 100% and
50% respectively as N →∞. More precisely, as n→∞, the
tolerable BER for Scheme A using 2n-level quantum particles
scales as ≈ 1/2 − (1 + √5)/2n+2. If N is a prime power,
eSBMER for Scheme A using N -level quantum particles scales
as ≈ 1 − (3 +√5)/2N as N → ∞. On the other hand, the
lemma below sets the upper limit for the tolerable SBMER
for Scheme A.
Lemma 6: The tolerable SBMER for Scheme A is upper-
bounded by (N − 1)/(N + 1). In fact, this bound is set
by the following interpret-and-resend strategy: for each N -
dimensional particle in the insecure quantum channel, Eve
randomly and independently picks M ∈ SL(2, N) and mea-
sures the particle in the basis {T (M)|i〉 : i ∈ GF (N)}. Then,
she records the measurement result and resends the measured
particle to Bob.
Proof: The proof follows the idea reported in Ref. [24].
Clearly, using this intercept-and-resend strategy, no quantum
correlation between Alice and Bob can survive and hence no
provably secure key can be distributed. Thus, this eavesdrop-
ping strategy sets the upper bound for the tolerable SMBER
and BER for Scheme A. If the quantum particle is prepared by
Alice and measured by Eve in the same basis, that particle will
suffer Za error with equal probability for all a ∈ GF (N). As
Scheme A depolarizes Pauli errors, we know that e00 induced
by this eavesdropping strategy equals 1/N . Therefore, the
SBMER for this strategy is [(1−1/N)/(N2−1)]×N(N−1) =
(N − 1)/(N + 1).
Thus, the difference between the tolerable SBMER and its
theoretical upper bound tends to zero in the limit of large N .
So in this limit, the error tolerance capability of Scheme A
approaches its maximally allowable value.
Third, readers may wonder why Scheme A is highly error-
tolerant especially when N is large. Every quantum cheating
strategy can be reduced to a classical one. Furthermore,
Lemma 3 tells us that Scheme A depolarizes the errors caused
by any classical cheating strategy in the transmitted quantum
signals. This greatly restricts the types of quantum errors
we need to consider. The LOCC2 EP becomes a powerful
tool to reduce spin errors at the expense of increasing phase
errors. Furthermore, ek EPZ0 > e
k EP
Zb
for all b 6= 0 provided that
e00 > e01. In other words, the dominant kind of phase error
is having no phase error at all. Thus, the majority vote PEC
procedure is effective in bringing down the phase error. This
is the underlying reason why Scheme A is so powerful that,
in the limit N →∞, eSBMER → 1−.
Fourth, the unconditional security proof in Theorem 3 does
not depend on the phase fM (a, b) used in Eq. (6). Recall from
the discussions in Subsection III-A that T : SL(2, 2n) −→
U(2n) is not a group representation. So, in practice, Alice
and Bob may replace T (M1M2 · · ·Mk) used in Scheme A
by T (Mk)T (Mk−1) · · ·T (M1), in which the Mi’s are chosen
from the two generators of SL(2, 2n).
Fifth, the privacy amplification performed in Scheme A is
based entirely on entanglement purification and phase error
correction. In fact, the key ingredient in reducing the QER
used in the proof of Theorem 3 is the validity of the condition
stated in Eq. (36). Nonetheless, there is no need to bring
down the QER to the small security parameter ǫI . One may
devise an equally secure scheme by following the adaptive
procedure introduced by Chau in Ref. [25] instead. That is to
say, Alice and Bob may switch to a concatenated Calderbank-
Shor-Steane quantum code when the PEC brings down the
QER to about 5%. The strategy of adding an extra step
of quantum error correction towards the end of the privacy
amplification procedure may increase the key generation rate.
To understand why, let us consider the proof of Theorem 3
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together with Eq. (34). They tell us that in order to bring
the QER down to less than ǫ after k rounds of LOCC2 EP,
Alice and Bob have to choose r and hence the number of
quantum registers needed in PEC to be ∼ ǫc2k for some
constant c > 1. In contrast, by randomizing the quantum
registers, the QER after each application of Steane’s seven
quantum register code is reduced quadratically whenever the
QER is less than about 5%. Consequently, Alice and Bob may
increase the key generation rate by performing less rounds
of LOCC2 EP, choosing ǫ ≈ 0.01, and finally adding a few
rounds of the Calderbank-Shor-Steane code quantum error
correction procedure.
V. REDUCTION TO THE PREPARE-AND-MEASURE
SCHEME
Finally, we apply the standard Shor and Preskill proof [22]
to reduce the EB Scheme A to two provably secure PM
schemes in this section. Let us first write down the detail
procedures of Schemes B and C before showing their security.
PM QKD Scheme B
1) Alice randomly and independently prepares L ≫ 1
quantum particles in the standard basis. She randomly
and independently applies a unitary transformation
T (M) ∈ T [G] to each quantum particle, where G
equals SL(2, N) or an order (N2 − 1) subgroup of
SL(2, N) (if it exists). Alice records the states and
transformations she applied and then sends the states
to Bob. Bob acknowledges the receipt of these particles
and then applies a randomly and independently picked
T (M ′)−1 to each received particle. Now, Alice and Bob
publicly reveal the unitary transformations they applied
to each particle. A particle is kept and is said to be in
the set SM if Alice and Bob have applied T (M) and
T (M)−1 to it respectively. Bob measures the particles in
SM in the standard basis and records the measurement
results.
2) Alice and Bob estimate the channel quantum error
rate by sacrificing a few particles. Specifically, they
randomly pick O([N+1]2 log[ |G|/ǫ]/δ2N2) pairs from
each of the |G| sets SM and publicly reveal the prepara-
tion and measured states for each of them. In this way,
they obtain the estimated channel error rate to within
δ with probability at least (1 − ǫ). If the channel error
rate is too high, they abort the scheme and start all over
again.
3) Alice and Bob perform the following privacy amplifica-
tion procedure.
a) They apply the privacy amplification procedure
with two-way classical communication similar to
the ones reported in Refs. [24], [25]. Specifically,
Alice and Bob randomly group their corresponding
remaining quantum particles in pairs. Suppose the
jth particle of the ith pair was initially prepared
in the state |sij 〉. Then, Alice publicly announces
the value si1 − si2 ∈ GF (N) for each pair
i. Similarly, Bob publicly announces the value
s′i1 − s′i2 where |s′ij 〉 is the measurement result of
the jth particle in the ith pair. They keep one of
their corresponding registers of the pair only when
their announced values of the corresponding pairs
agree. They repeat the above procedure until there
is an integer r > 0 such that a single application
of step 3b will bring the signal quantum error
rate of the resultant particles down to ǫI/ℓ2 for
a fixed security parameter ǫI > 0, where rℓ is the
number of remaining quantum particles they have.
They abort the scheme either when r is greater
than the number of remaining quantum particles
they possess or when they have used up all their
quantum particles in this procedure.
b) They apply the majority vote phase error correction
procedure introduced by Gottesman and Lo [24].
Specifically, Alice and Bob randomly divide their
corresponding resultant particles into sets each
containing r particles. They replace each set by
the sum of the values prepared (by Alice) or
measured (by Bob) of the r particles in the set.
These replaced values are bits of their final secure
key string.
EQB PM QKD Scheme C[2n, nns]
1) Alice and Bob agree on a bijection mapping GF (2n) to
an n-bit string. Alice prepares L≫ 1 sets; and each set
contains n qubits that are randomly and independently
prepared in the standard basis {|i〉 : i ∈ GF (2n)}
identified through their mutually agreed bijection. She
records the state of each set in the form of an n-bit
string. Then, she randomly and independently applies
T (M) ∈ T [G] to each set of qubits, where G equals
C3 < SL(2, 2) and SL(2, 2n) for n = 1 and n > 1
respectively. She permutes the n qubits in each set with
nns randomly prepared non-signaling qubits and sends
them to Bob. (In the upcoming analysis, one finds that
for a fixed n, the tolerable BER of this scheme increases
with nns. However, the number of non-signaling qubits
used is limited by the absence of quantum storage
capability.) After Bob has received these qubits, Alice
tells him which of the n qubits belong to a set that will
be used to generate the key. Bob measures and discards
the nns non-signaling qubits and applies a randomly
and independently picked T (M ′)−1 to each of the n
qubits in the set that will be used to generate the
key. Now, Alice and Bob publicly reveal their unitary
transformations applied to each set. A set is kept and
is said to be in SM if Alice and Bob have applied
T (M) and T (M)−1 to it respectively. Bob records the
standard basis measurement results identified through
their mutually agreed on bijection in the form of an
n-bit string for each set in SM . At this point, Alice and
Bob should each have |G| families of n-bit strings; each
family contains the prepare state/measurement result of
qubits in SM . Moreover, in the absence of noise and
Eve, the corresponding bit strings in Alice’s and Bob’s
hands should agree.
2) Alice and Bob regard their |G| families of n-bit strings
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as states in the standard basis {|i〉 : i ∈ GF (N)} and
follow steps 2 and 3 in Scheme B to obtain their secret
key.
Note that in Scheme C[2n, nns] (or Scheme C for short if
the values of n and nns are clearly known to the readers), apart
from the possibly entangled qubits that are used to generate
the secret key, Alice and Bob have to create and send random
non-signaling qubits through the insecure channel. The proofs
of Theorems 4 and 5 below tell us that while the use of
non-signaling qubits does not change the tolerable BER, it is
essential for Scheme C to tolerate more drastic eavesdropping
attacks.
Theorem 4 (Based on Shor and Preskill [22]): The tolera-
ble BER of Scheme A in Subsection III-B as well as
Schemes B and C above are equal. Thus, the conclusion of
Theorem 3 is also applicable to Schemes B and C.
Proof: Recall from Ref. [22] that Alice may measure all
her share of quantum registers right at step 1 in Scheme A
without affecting the security of the scheme. Besides, LOCC2
EP and PEC procedures in Scheme A simply permute the
measurement basis. Also, the final secret key generation does
not make use of the phase information of the transmitted quan-
tum registers. Hence, the Shor-Preskill argument in Ref. [22]
can be applied to Scheme A, giving us equally secure PM
Schemes B and C. (Note that the introduction of random non-
signaling qubits does not affect the tolerable BER of Scheme C
as these qubits are discarded after being measured and are not
used to generate the secret key.)
As discussed in Subsection IV-A, we cannot compare the
error tolerant capability of Scheme B that uses unentangled
quantum particles of different dimensions as information car-
riers. Nonetheless, we can compare the error tolerant capability
of the EQB PM QKD Scheme C against the same eavesdrop-
ping attack.
Theorem 5: For any fixed n, the error tolerant capabil-
ity of Scheme C[2n, nns] increases with nns in the limit
of a large
∑
M∈SL(2,2n) |SM |. Besides, in the limits of a
large
∑
M∈SL(2,2n) |SM | and a large nns, the error tolerant
capability of Scheme C[2n, nns] increases with n. That is
to say, for any fixed n and in the limit of a large nns,
whenever Scheme C[2n, nns] generates a provably secure key
under an eavesdropping attack, so does Scheme C[2n′ , nns]
under the same attack for any n′ > n. Furthermore, there
is a family of eavesdropping attacks that can be tolerated
by Scheme C[2n′ , nns]. However, no provably secure key is
produced in Scheme C[2n, nns].
Proof: Recall that Alice sends Bob packets of qubits each
containing n signaling as well as nns non-signaling qubits and
that any eavesdropping strategy in Scheme C is equivalent
to a classical probabilistic cheating strategy. Suppose that the
channel quantum error rate is q. In other words, the probability
that a randomly chosen qubit passing through the insecure
channel is in error equals q. Let qk denote the portion of
packets that contains exactly k erroneous qubits. Then, qk’s
satisfy the following three constraints:
n+nns∑
k=0
qk = 1, (41)
n+nns∑
k=0
k qk = (n+ nns) q, (42)
and
0 ≤ qk ≤ 1 (43)
for k = 0, 1, . . . , n+nns. Clearly, the set of (q0, q1, . . . , qn+nns)
satisfying the above three constraints is convex.
Since Eve does not know which qubits are signaling before
Bob has received them, the QER for the signaling qubits is
given by
qQER =
n+nns∑
k=1
(
1−
k−1∏
i=0
nns − i
n+ nns − i
)
qk
= 1−
n+nns∑
k=0
(
qk
n−1∏
i=0
n+ nns − k − i
n+ nns − i
)
. (44)
We claim that for any qk’s satisfying the three constraints (41)–
(43), qQER is upper-bounded by
qQER ≤ 1−
⌊(n+nns)q⌋+1∑
k=⌊(n+nns)q⌋
(
q˜k
n−1∏
i=0
n+ nns − k − i
n+ nns − i
)
, (45)
where q˜k’s are the (unique) solutions of the system of equa-
tions
⌊(n+nns)q⌋+1∑
k=⌊(n+nns)q⌋
q˜k = 1 (46)
and
⌊(n+nns)q⌋+1∑
k=⌊(n+nns)q⌋
k q˜k = (n+ nns) q. (47)
In other words, we claim that among all strategies that cause
a channel quantum error rate q, the one that causes either
⌊(n + nns)q⌋ or ⌊(n + nns)q⌋ + 1 erroneous qubits in each
packet produces the highest QER in the signaling qubits.
To show the validity of our claim, we rewrite Eq. (44) as
qQER = 1−
⌊(n+nns)q⌋+1∑
k=⌊(n+nns)q⌋
(
q˜k
n−1∏
i=0
n+ nns − k − i
n+ nns − i
)
−
n+nns∑
k=0
(
∆qk
n−1∏
i=0
n+ nns − k − i
n+ nns − i
)
, (48)
where ∆qk = qk− q˜k if k = ⌊(n+nns)q⌋ or ⌊(n+nns)q⌋+1,
and ∆qk = qk otherwise. Since the set of (q0, . . . , qn+nns)
satisfying Eqs. (41)–(43) is convex, the claim is valid if we
can show that the last term in Eq. (48) is non-positive for all
∆qk’s satisfying
∑
k∆qk =
∑
k k∆qk = 0 and ∆qj ≥ 0
whenever j = ⌊(n+ nns)q⌋ or ⌊(n+ nns)q⌋+ 1.
There are three cases to consider. The first case is that
∆qk ≥ 0 for all k. Clearly, this is possible only if ∆qk = 0
for all k. So in this case, the last term in Eq. (48) equals 0.
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The second case is that exactly one ∆qk < 0. Without lost
of generality, we may assume that the one is ∆q⌊(n+nns)q⌋. Ob-
serve that one can tune Λi’s to make the auxiliary real-valued
function ξ in the equation below two times differentiable and
ξ′′ ≥ 0 in (0, n+ nns):
ξ(k) =


n−1∏
i=0
Γ(n+ nns − k − i+ 1) if 0 ≤ k ≤ nns,
3∑
i=0
Λik
i if nns < k < nns + 1,
0 if k ≥ nns + 1.
(49)
Consequently, such a ξ(k) is a convex function in the interval
[0, n+ nns]. Since
∑
k 6=⌊(n+nns)q⌋
∆qk = −∆q⌊(n+nns)q⌋ > 0,
the convexity of ξ implies that the last term in Eq. (48) is
non-positive.
The last case is that exactly two ∆qk < 0, namely, for k =
⌊(n+nns)q⌋ and ⌊(n+nns)q⌋+1. In this situation,
∑
k∆qk =∑
k k∆qk = 0 demands that there exist ∆qk1 ,∆qk2 > 0
for some k1 < ⌊(n + nns)q⌋ and k2 > ⌊(n + nns)q⌋ + 1.
Consequently, we may define ∆q′j = ∆q′′j = 0 for j = ⌊(n+
nns)q⌋ and ⌊(n+nns)q⌋+1 and decompose ∆qk as ∆q′k+∆q′′k
for all k 6= ⌊(n+ nns)q⌋, ⌊(n+ nns)q⌋+ 1 in such a way that
∆q′k,∆q
′′
k ≥ 0 for all k and
∑
k∆q
′
k = −∆q⌊(n+nns)q⌋ and∑
k∆q
′′
k = −∆q⌊(n+nns)q⌋+1. By means of this decomposition
and the convexity of the function ξ, we conclude that the last
term in Eq. (48) is non-positive. Hence, the claim in Eq. (45)
is valid.
From Eqs. (45)–(47), it is easy to check that for a fixed
n, tolerable BER of Scheme C[2n, nns] increases with nns.
Combining with Eq. (39) and Table II, we conclude that
for n = 2, q ≈ 1.5 × 0.2764 and qQER . 1.25 × 0.5340,
nns ≥ 23. Thus, Scheme C[4, nns] generates a provably secure
key when the channel bit error rate is slightly higher than
27.64% provided that nns ≥ 23. Thus, this scheme is more
error-resistant than any UQB QKD scheme known to date.
Note that as nns → ∞, the right hand side of Eq. (45)
becomes 1 − (1 − q)n. (A simple way to argue why this is
the case is to observe that in the limit of a large number of
random non-signaling qubits used, Eve can do no better than
guessing which of the n qubits in a packet are used to generate
the secret key when these qubits are traveling in the insecure
channel.) As the Pauli signal quantum error is depolarized,
Lemma 3 demands that the error rates caused by this classical
probabilistic strategy are given by
eab =


(1− q)n if a = b = 0,
1− (1 − q)n
22n − 1 otherwise.
(50)
From Eq. (40), the final key is provably secure provided that
the probability q satisfies
q < qcrit(n) ≡ 1− 1
2
[
(1 +
√
5)22n − (√5− 1)
2(22n + 2n − 1)
]1/n
. (51)
Since qcrit(n) is a strictly increasing function of n, we conclude
that the error tolerant capability of Scheme C[2n, nns] strictly
increases with increasing n in the limit of large nns. Hence,
this theorem is proved.
Since the most error-resistant UQB PM scheme known
to date is the one offered by Chau in Ref. [25] (which
is also equivalent to Scheme C[2, 0]), the above theorem
clearly shows the advantage of using entangled qubits as
information carriers provided that Alice and Bob can transmit
a large number of qubits without requiring quantum storage.
Specifically, no UQB PM scheme to date can generate a
provably secure key if Eve randomly causes an error to a qubit
in the insecure quantum channel with probability q satisfying
0.4146 ≈ qcrit(1) ≤ q < qcrit(2) ≈ 0.4234. In contrast,
Scheme C[2n, nns] tolerates such an attack for any n ≥ 2
and for a sufficiently large nns depending on n.
We emphasize that the use of random non-signaling qubits
is vital in the proof of Theorem 5. Otherwise, Eve may cause
100% signal quantum error in Scheme C[2n, nns] by creating
an X error to every one out of n consecutive qubits that passes
through the insecure quantum channel. However, we also have
to stress that the presence of non-signaling qubits lowers the
key generation rate of Scheme C. In the absence of quantum
storage, the number of non-signaling qubits per packet nns
is limited by the decoherence time of qubits and the qubit
transmission rate in the channel. The proof of Theorem 5 tells
us that for n = 2, Alice and Bob need to use nns = 23
in order to generate a provably secure key at a channel
BER slightly higher than that which can be tolerated by all
UQB QKD schemes known to date. Clearly, Scheme C[4, 23]
generates a key at a rate 8% that of Scheme C[2, 0]. Moreover,
manipulating a packet of 25 qubits in the absence of quantum
storage in Scheme C[4, 23] is challenging.
Now, we discuss the number of different kinds of states
Alice and Bob have to prepare and measure in Schemes B
and C.
Theorem 6: Suppose Alice and Bob follow Schemes B or C
with G = SL(2, N), so that they prepare and measure in
N(N + 1) bases (and hence N2(N + 1) different states). If
they choose G to be an order (N2−1) subgroup of SL(2, N)
instead, they need to prepare and measure in (N+1) different
bases (and hence N(N + 1) states).
Proof: Case (1): G = SL(2, N). Let G′ be the
subgroup {diag(α, α−1) : α ∈ GF (N)∗} of SL(2, N).
Let g, g′ ∈ G′ and h ∈ SL(2, N). From Eqs. (6)–(7),
〈i|T (gh)−1T (g′h)|i′〉 = ω−Tr(i′k)p 〈i|T (gh)−1T (g′h)Zk|i′〉
= ω
−Tr(i′k)
p 〈i|Zkβ−1T (gh)−1T (g′h)|i′〉 = ωTr([β
−1i−i′]k)
p
〈i|T (gh)−1T (g′h)|i′〉 for all k ∈ GF (N), where g′g =
diag(β, β−1). Therefore, 〈i|T (gh)−1T (g′h)|i′〉 = 0 if i 6= i′β.
In other words, the bases {T (gh)|i〉 : i ∈ GF (N)} and
{T (g′h)|i〉 : i ∈ GF (N)} are the same. Consequently, if
Alice and Bob choose G = SL(2, N) in Schemes B and C,
they need to prepare and measure in N(N2 − 1)/(N − 1) =
N(N + 1) bases (and hence N2(N + 1) different states).
Case (2): N = 2 and G is the order 3 subgroup of SL(2, 2).
Theorem 8 in the Appendix tells us that G is unique. It is clear
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that, in this case, Alice and Bob need to prepare and measure
their quantum states in three different bases.
Case (3): N > 2 and G is the order (N2 − 1) subgroup
of SL(2, N). Theorem 8 in the Appendix implies that N =
3, 5, 7, 11. Besides, G contains an order (N − 1) subgroup
H ′ in the form {P−1diag(α, α−1)P : α ∈ GF (N)∗} for
some P ∈ SL(2, N). Recall from Subsection III-A that
T : SL(2, N) −→ U(N) in this case is a transposed
representation. Hence, from Eq. (7), 〈i|T (gh)−1T (g′h)|i′〉
= 〈i|T (g′g−1)|i′〉 = 〈i|T (diag(β, β−1))|i′〉 = 〈i|i′β−1〉 for
some β ∈ GF (N)∗. Hence, Alice and Bob need to prepare
and measure in (N2 − 1)/(N − 1) = N + 1 different bases
(and hence N(N + 1) states).
Since the maximum number of mutually unbiased bases
equals (N + 1) for any prime power N [32], [33], [34],
Scheme B shows that certain PM QKD schemes not using
mutually unbiased bases can be more error-tolerant.
VI. DISCUSSIONS
In summary, we have introduced two PM QKD schemes
(Schemes B and C) based on depolarization of Pauli errors and
proved their unconditional security. In particular, we showed
that for a sufficiently large Hilbert space dimension of quantum
particles N used, Scheme B generates a provably secure key
close to 100% SBMER or 50% BER. This result demon-
strates the advantages of using unentangled higher dimensional
quantum particles as signal carriers as well as depolarizing
Pauli errors in QKD. It also shows that, for N > 2, the
use of certain non-mutually unbiased bases increases the error
tolerance capability of QKD. In addition, Scheme C shows
that the ability to create and transfer, but not to store entangled
qubits is advantageous in quantum cryptography.
There is a tradeoff between the error tolerance rate and
key generation efficiency, however. It is clear from the proof
of Theorem 3 that r, and hence the number L of quantum
particles transferred from Alice and Bob, scales as 2k. Besides,
the probability that the measurement results agree and hence
the control quantum register pairs are kept in LOCC2 EP
equals ≈ 1/N in the worst case. As a result, while Schemes B
and C are highly error-tolerant, they generate a secret key
with exponentially small efficiency in the worst case scenario.
Fortunately, the adaptive nature of Schemes B and C makes
sure that this scenario will not happen when the error rate
of the channel is small. To conclude, in most practical situa-
tions, Alice and Bob should choose the smallest possible N
whose corresponding eSBMER is slightly larger than the channel
standard basis measurement error rate. In this way, they can
generate their provably secure key at the highest possible rate.
APPENDIX
This appendix discusses the possibility of depolarizing Pauli
error using proper subgroups of SL(2, N). The analysis makes
use of the Dickson theorem [35] on the subgroup classification
of projective special linear groups over finite fields. The
version of the Dickson theorem listed below is due to Huppert
in the Hauptsatz 8.27 in Ref. [36].
Theorem 7 (Dickson): Let N = pn. Subgroups of
PSL(2, N) are isomorphic to one of the following families
of groups:
1) Elementary Abelian p-groups;
2) Cyclic groups Cz of order z, where z is a divisor of
(N ± 1)/(N − 1, 2) ;
3) Dihedral groups Dz of order 2z, where z is as defined
in 2);
4) Alternating group A4 (this can occur only for p > 2 or
when p = 2 and n ≡ 0 mod 2);
5) Symmetric group S4 (this can occur only if N2 ≡
1 mod 16);
6) Alternating group A5 (this can occur only if p = 5 or
N2 ≡ 1 mod 5);
7) A semidirect product of an elementary Abelian group of
order pm with a cyclic group of order t, where t is a
divisor of (pm − 1, N − 1);
8) The group PSL(2, pm) for m a divisor of n, or the
group PGL(2, pm) for 2m a divisor of n.
In addition to the Dickson theorem, the following lemma is
also needed.
Lemma 7: If N is odd, −I is the only element in SL(2, N)
whose order is 2.
Proof: Let M =
[
α β
δ γ
]
be an order 2 element in
SL(2, N). M2 = I implies β(α + γ) = δ(α + γ) = 0 and
α2 + βδ = 1. If α + γ = 0, detM = −α2 − βδ = 1 is
consistent with α2 + βδ = 1 only if N is even. So, α + γ
must be equal to 0. Hence, β = γ = 0 and M = ±I . As N
is odd, −I is the only order 2 element in SL(2, N).
We examine the possibility of using a smaller group to
depolarize Pauli error in step 1. Specifically, we look for
subgroups H of SL(2, N) to do the job. Clearly, the order
of the subgroup H must be a multiple of (N2 − 1).
Theorem 8: Proper subgroups H of SL(2, N) satisfying
(N2 − 1) | |H | exist only for N = 2, 3, 5, 7, 11 and |H | =
N2 − 1. Specifically,
1) When N = 2, H ∼= C3. Moreover, this subgroup is
unique and is generated by one element. In fact, H =〈[
0 1
1 1
]〉
.
2) When N = 3, H ∼= Q8. Moreover, this subgroup is
unique and is generated by two elements. In fact, H =〈[
1 1
1 2
]
,
[
1 2
2 2
]〉
.
3) When N = 5, H/{±I} ∼= A4. Moreover, H is
generated by two elements. One possible choice of H
is
〈[
2 0
0 3
]
,
[
1 2
1 3
]〉
.
4) When N = 7, H/{±I} ∼= S4. Moreover, H is gen-
erated by two elements. One possible choice of H is〈[
2 0
0 4
]
,
[
1 2
1 3
]〉
.
5) When N = 11, H/{±I} ∼= A5. Moreover, H is
generated by two elements. One possible choice of H
is
〈[
2 0
0 6
]
,
[
1 1
1 2
]〉
.
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Furthermore, |{M ∈ H : M [a b]t = [c d]t}| = 1 for
all [a b], [c d] 6= [0 0]. Thus, replacing SL(2, N) by H in
Scheme A also depolarizes Pauli errors.
Proof: From the Dickson theorem, it follows that
SL(2, N) does not contain a proper subgroup H whose order
divides (N2 − 1) if N 6= 2, 3, 5, 7, 11. Moreover, if H exists
for N = 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, |H | = N2− 1. In what follows, we are
going to show that such H indeed exist for N = 2, 3, 5, 7, 11.
Case (1): When N = 2, the Dickson theorem implies that
if H exists, H ∼= C3. Since the only order 3 elements of
SL(2, 2) are M21 ≡
[
0 1
1 1
]
and M221, the order 3 subgroup
H of SL(2, 2) exists and is unique. An explicit expression for
T (M21) is given in Table I for reference.
Case (2): When N = 3, the Dickson theorem implies that if
H exists, H/{±I} ∼= D2 ∼= C2×C2. H cannot be Abelian as
H would then be isomorphic to C2 ×C2 ×C2, contradicting
Lemma 7. Since H is a non-Abelian group of order 8, H
is generated by two elements. By Lemma 7 and the proof of
Proposition 6.3 in Ref. [37], we conclude that the two elements
generating H are both of order 4. Hence, H ∼= Q8. Note that
the only order 4 elements of SL(2, 3) are M31 ≡
[
1 1
1 2
]
,
−M31, M32 ≡
[
1 2
2 2
]
, −M32, M31M32 and M32M31.
Therefore, 〈M31,M32〉 is the only order (N2 − 1) subgroup
of SL(2, 3). Explicit expressions for T (M31) and T (M32) are
given in Table I for reference.
Case (3): When N = 5, the Dickson theorem implies that
if H exists, H/{±I} ∼= A4 or D6. Satz 8.13 in Ref. [36]
says that PSL(2, 5) ∼= A5. Hence, the only possibility is
that H/{±I} ∼= A4. Since A4 can be generated by two
elements, one of order 2 and the other of order 3, H/{±I} =
〈M51/{±I},M52/{±I}〉 for some M51,M52 ∈ SL(2, 5)
provided that H exists. Moreover M51/{±I} and M52/{±I}
are of order 2 and 3, respectively. We may assume that M352 =
−I , for otherwise replace M52 by −M52. Consequently, the
subgroup H , if it exists, is equal to 〈−I,M51,M52〉 =
〈M51,M52〉. Thus, H can be generated by two elements in
SL(2, 5). From Lemma 7, the order of M51 is equal to 4. By
explicit search, H exists but is not unique. One possible H is{[
2 0
0 3
]
,
[
1 2
1 3
]}
.
Case (4): When N = 7, the Dickson theorem implies that
if H exists, H/{±I} ∼= S4. Since S4 is generated by two
elements, namely (1234) and (123), the subgroup H/{±I},
if it exists, equals 〈M71/{±I},M72/{±I}〉. Moreover, using
the same argument as in the proof of case (3), we may
choose M471 = ±I and M372 = −I . Hence, H , if it
exists, is equal to 〈−I,M71,M72〉 = 〈M71,M72〉. By an
explicit search, H exists but is not unique. One possible H is〈[
2 0
0 4
]
,
[
1 2
1 3
]〉
.
Case (5): When N = 11, the Dickson theorem implies that
if H exists, H/{±I} ∼= A5. Since A5 is generated by two
elements, namely (12345) and (123), using the same argument
as in the proof of cases (3) and (4), we conclude that H , if it
exists, can be generated by two elements. An explicit search
tells us that H exists but not unique, and one possible H is
〈[
2 0
0 6
]
,
[
1 1
1 2
]〉
.
To show that |{M ∈ H : M [a b]t = [c d]t}| = 1
for all [a b], [c d] 6= [0 0], we observe from our dis-
cussion of the structure of H above, that H contains an
order (N − 1) proper subgroup H ′. Since H ′ < SL(2, N),
H ′ = {P−1diag(α, α−1)P : α ∈ GF (N)∗} for some P ∈
SL(2, N). As all order (N2 − 1) subgroups of SL(2, N) are
conjugate to each other, it suffices to show the validity for
P = I . As N ∤ |H | = N2 − 1, H does not contain elements
of the form
[
α β
0 α−1
]
or
[
0 α
−α−1 β
]
for some β 6= 0.
Therefore, for any M =
[
α β
δ γ
]
∈ SL(2, N),
|{H ′MH ′}| = |{M ′MM ′′ : M ′,M ′′ ∈ H ′}|
=
{
N − 1 if α = 0 or δ = 0,
(N − 1)2 if α, δ 6= 0. (52)
Also, the first column of matrices in H ′MH ′ are all distinct.
Since |H | = N2 − 1, Eq. (52) requires that the first columns
of the matrices in H are all distinct. Hence, |{M ∈ H :
M [a b]t = [c d]t}| = 1 for all [a b], [c d] 6= [0 0]. Combining
with the fact that H ′ is a group, Scheme A depolarizes Pauli
errors.
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